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Abstract: This paper attempts to analyse the colonisation of Kenya by the British colonial government 
and the necessary genocidal effect on the ethnic group known as the Kikuyu through the lens of genocide 
as understood by Raphael Lemkin, the neologist of the term, and the post-liberal tradition he inspired. 
The latter tradition is grounded in a sociological understanding of genocide which this paper will argue is 
the most appropriate methodology in the study of a phenomenon which is itself of a sociological nature. 
Only by applying what has come to be known as a Lemkinian analysis, infused with a Marxist analysis of 
social entities, (international) political economy and geo-politics can the structures of genocide not only be 
revealed but explained. What will be termed a neo-Lemkinian analysis, will demonstrate the critical role of 
the capitalist mode of production and its attendant state both globally and locally in the destruction of the 
group life of the Kikuyu. The relations of genocide will thus be shown to be capitalist relations of genocide.
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1. Introduction
‘Genocide is collective homicide and not official vandalism or violation of civil liberties’: It is directed against the 
life of man and not against his material or mental goods’1 
Genocide is what Powell2 has called an essentially contested term.  There is no universally agreed sociological definition 
of what constitutes an act of genocide.  Perhaps a more apt characterisation would be to see genocide as an essentially 
invidious term, for it arouses almost by definition heated, divisive debate, it polarises inflexible opinions and engenders 
intractable and partisan obstinacies.  There are as many theories of genocide as there are ‘cases’ or instances of it. The red 
mist that descends among scholars of genocide seems the very opposite of dispassionate and disinterested observation 
and analysis that are the hallmarks of any science.  But who among us can genuinely claim that when we examine the 
physical or social world and fix our intellectually curious gaze upon it that we are ‘disinterested’ in the sense of being 
only motivated by truth bereft of any agenda, however vague or unconscious it may be?  Can any environmental 
scientist when documenting the destruction and breakdown of eco-systems or the melting of the earth’s polar ice sheets 
not hope that her work may act as an intervention that induces political will to mitigate or avert the damage to the 
planet?  Which pupil of political science or international relations, whilst aspiring to reach the highest standards of 
1 Pieter Nicolaas Drost. Genocide: United Nations Legalisation on International Criminal Law. (Leyden: A. W. Sythoff, 1959), p.32.
2 Christopher Powell, ‘What Do Genocides Kill? A relational conception of genocide’, Journal of Genocide Research, 9 no. 4 (2007),  
pp.527–547. 
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objectivity, doesn’t also yearn for a democratic or inter-state system that ushers in peace, stability and supports human 
flourishing? 
This is perhaps more so when examining the woeful and horrendous topic of genocide; it is after all, the crime of 
all crimes. Therefore our pronouncements on such an issue will (hopefully) affect those subject to its devastating and 
crippling effects. We must therefore adopt what Powell3 calls a ‘critical sociology’ and acknowledge that one is in effect 
taking sides – wittingly or otherwise – when conducting studies of social phenomenon as egregious as genocide.  We 
cannot hide and skulk behind the facade of neutrality.
It is with this in mind that this study of the ethnic group known as the Kikuyu in the former British colony of 
Kenya was embarked upon.  The thesis intends to explore the genocidal effects of British colonial policy on the largest 
ethnic grouping in Kenya to deepen and enrich our knowledge of genocide and the genocidal nature of colonization. 
It also seeks to give voice to the subaltern, to the oppressed; to strengthen the claims to justice of the victims that 
suffered the privations of land alienation shortly after the arrival of the Imperial British East Africa Company in 1888 
and the horrors of the emergency period from October 1952 to December 1959.  More than this it seeks to illuminate 
the inner structural connections between the late capitalist phase of imperialism and genocide in order to repudiate 
the notion that genocide is somehow an aberration of the social and political system, a pathological breakdown of the 
normal functioning of our society’s institutions of economy and government.
The key research question this paper will be exploring is the genocide of the Kikuyu employing a neo-Lemkinian 
ontological lens with some modifications to make the Kenyan colonial experience explicable in Lemkinian terms, an 
endeavour that as yet has not been attempted.  The Lemkinian understanding of genocide draws attention to that which 
is arguably the critical and defining aspect of genocide, namely cultural destruction.  It will be a neo-Lemkinian analysis 
because in some respects Lemkin’s ontology is a product of its time in need of fresh insights that can rectify some of the 
theoretical weaknesses of his axioms and presuppositions.
The central thesis will consist of the charge that the genocidal practises, or techniques as Lemkin called them, 
enacted on behalf of the British Crown, fatally damaged the essential foundations’of the Kikuyu as a viable and cohesive 
ethnic group, first by the policy of land alienation or theft and then the draconian measures enacted to suppress the 
‘Mau Mau’ rebellion during the period of state emergency lasting from October 1952 to December 1959.  It will be 
argued that the net effect of the structure of colonization was to leave the Kikuyu with no appreciable collective culture 
at all, ensuring that cultural destruction became cultural genocide.
To ascertain whether in fact the colonial practises were genocidal, a brief digression into an ethnographic analysis 
to determine the defining features or essential foundations of the Kikuyu collectivity will be necessary. This will then 
be used as an empirical baseline to enable an analysis of the impact of the aforementioned techniques on the collective 
group life of the Kikuyu.
To explicate the genocidal process in neo-Lemkinian terms, an analysis of both the question of land dispossession 
(a key technique cited by Lemkin) from approximately the beginning of the twentieth century up to and including 
the period of the Mau Mau rebellion and an analysis of the period of the rebellion and the state of emergency itself in 
Kenya from 1952 to 1958 will be conducted. The aim is to construct a case that the ethnic group of the Kikuyu were 
the victims of genocide, identifying which of the techniques articulated by Lemkin in his seminal works were employed 
by the colonial authorities. The crux of the paper’s methodology will consist of using the Lemkinian techniques of 
genocide as found in Axis Rule in Occupied Europe4 (from here on Axis Rule) as a methodological tool set that will be 
cross-referenced with the data on the period outlined earlier. Furthermore, by employing a non-reductionist Marxist 
theory of imperialism, the inner connections of global capitalist economic and geo-political structures with the local 
Kenyan colony will be illuminated.
The central contention of this paper is that the genocide of the Kikuyu was the necessary product of the expansion 
and imposition of the bourgeois occupant’s capitalist mode of production (MOP), a MOP inimical to the Kikuyu way 
of life. As Marx eloquently put it:
It [the bourgeoisie] compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; 
it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. 
In one word, it creates a world after its own image.5
3 Christopher Powell, Barbaric Civilization: A Critical Sociology of Genocide. (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens’s University Press, 2011), 
ch.1.
4 Rafael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress. (Washington DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace Division of International Law, 1944), pp.82–90.
5 Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto, (London: Penguin Books, 2004), p.8.
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Herein lies the ultimate structural root of the cultural genocide of the Kikuyu.  Thus cultural genocide here is translated 
and understood as capitalist genocide.
Genocide: A Neo-Lemkinian Paradigm 
Due to the cold war legacy of the social construction of the genocide convention6 and the tardy and ponderous 
nature of sociology’s engagement with the holocaust and the discipline of genocide studies7 we have been left with two 
competing definitions of genocide: The liberal tradition’s fixation on the UN convention and its emphasis on physical 
and biological destruction of a group, the issue of intent as such and States as the principal perpetrators; and that which 
the post-liberal school draws from Axis Rule In Europe and Lemkin’s unpublished magnum opus History of Genocide.8 
The latter tradition tends to focus on ‘culture’ as the master concept and understands genocide as an objective process 
or structure with multiple aspects.
Post-liberals adopt a holist ontology analogous to that which informed Durkheim’s The Rules of Sociological Method9 
or Marx’s introduction to Grundrisse.10  This is a structure-centred ontology which sees social structures as independent 
of individuals and their subjective impressions.  Accordingly, genocide is seen as a structural process which does not 
depend on the exterminatory, intending agent of state officials, but is capable of conceiving of the ‘social forces extant in 
all modernizing and colonizing societies that seek to sequester indigenous land and kill its owners if they are resisted’.11 
This ontological stance is alert to the possibility of genocide where social collectivities have been destroyed but where 
what Barta12 described as black letter evidence is absent.  As Barta observed ‘only historians who take seriously the truth 
that intentions and understandings are expressed in actions as well as words can have access to the realities of the past’.13 
This approach is aware that intention and motive in the case of colonial occupation are not one and the same and 
nor do they have to be.  Marx reminds us that too often we seek explanation in the will of those acting and ignore the 
objective nature of the relationships which structure and delimit the realm of possibilities. 14  Accordingly, genocidal 
intent as understood by the ‘post-liberal school’ is present in the dynamic, social, economic and political structures 
of society. That which Barta described as ‘relations of genocide’ and Wolfe as a ‘logic of elimination’, is invariably a 
function of the imposition of an inimical socio-economic system.15
Furthermore, the extant social and economic forces that are made invisible by the liberal traditions ontological 
blind spot, once illuminated by a post-liberal paradigm, reveal the global interconnectivity of the structure of genocide 
with a larger chain of global capitalist production and trade. Wolfe remarked that settler colonialism
6 For the social construction of the UN convention and the vexed question of cultural genocide see Kreiken (2004,125-51; 2008, 128–55).
7 Damien Short ‘Cultural Genocide and Indigenous peoples: a sociological approach’, The International Journal of Human Rights, 14 nos. 6–7 
(2010), p.831.  
8 See Michael A. McDonnell and A. Dirk Moses, ‘Raphael Lemkin as Historian of Genocide in the Americas’, Journal of Genocide Research, 
7 no. 4, (2005) pp.501–529. For a fuller discussion of the ontological presuppositions of the respective schools see Powell, What Do 
Genocides Kill? pp.530–3 and Dirk Moses ‘Conceptual Blockages and Definitional Dilemmas in the “Racial Century”’, Patterns of Prejudice, 
36 no. 4, (2002) p.7–36. Sufficed to say the liberal ontology, with its focus on the individual as the perpetrator and subject of genocide 
the individualist ontology, is blind to the emergent group properties of social collectivities such as language, culture and kinship and 
cannot account for the structural determinants of genocide. Therefore the individualist ontology would disqualify this study of the group 
life of the Kikuyu and the effects of colonial policy on their collective existence. What Card described as ‘social death’ cannot be captured 
by an individualistic notion of group life. Claudia Card, ‘Genocide and social death’, Hypatia, 18 no.1 (2003), pp.63–79.  It would also 
disqualify the many well documented cases of colonial genocide, such as the native Indian genocide in the Americas. See Russell Thornton, 
American Indian Holocaust and Survival, (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987); Ward Churchill, Little Matter of 
Genocide (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1997); David Stannard, American Holocaust, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992). This is also the case for the Aborigines in Australia. See Tony Barta, ‘Relations of Genocide: Land and Lives in the Colonization of 
Australia’, in: Isodor Walliman  and Michael Dobrowski (eds.) Genocide and the Modern Age: Etiology and Case Studies of Mass Death, (New 
York: Greenwood Press, 1987); Barta  ‘“They appear actually to vanish from the face of the Earth.” Aborigines and the European project in 
Australia Felix’, Journal of Genocide Research, 10 no.4, (2008) pp.519–539; Damien Short, ‘Australia: A Continuing Genocide?’, Journal of 
Genocide Research, 12 no.1–2 (2010), 45–68; Patrick Wolfe, ‘Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native’, Journal of Genocide 
Research, 8 no.4 (2006) 387–409.
9 Émile Durkheim, ‘The rules of sociological method’, in: Lukes, S. (ed.) Durkheim: The Rules of Sociological Method and Selected Texts on 
Sociology and its Method, (New York: The Free Press, 1982)
10 Karl Marx, ‘Marxist Methodology’, in: Elster, J. (ed.) Karl Marx: A Reader, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
11 Moses, ‘Conceptual Blockages and Definitional Dilemmas in the “Racial Century”’, p.22.
12 Tony Barta, ‘Three Responses to “Can There Be Genocide Without the Intent to Commit Genocide”’, Journal of Genocide Research, 10 no.1 
(2008), p.118.
13 Ibid.
14 Karl Marx, ‘The Defence of the Moselle Correspondent: Economic Distress and Freedom of the Press’, in: Lloyd D. Easton and Kurt H. 
Guddat (eds.) Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1967) pp.144–145.
15 See Barta, ‘Relations of Genocide’, pp.246–247; Wolfe, ‘Settler Colonialism’, p.387.
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presupposed a global chain of command linking remote colonial frontiers to the metropolis. Behind it all 
lay the driving engine of international market forces, which linked Australian wool to Yorkshire mills and, 
complementarily, to cotton produced under different colonial conditions in India, Egypt, and the slave states 
of the Deep South.16
It is this global interconnectivity that will be evinced in the analysis of the Kikuyu genocide and its structural roots in 
the capitalist MOP and British colonialism.
Conceptual Blockages and the Marxist Bypass
As argued above the post-liberal school will be employed to analyse the situation coloniale found in Kenya.  However, 
its weaknesses are twofold. Firstly, taking their cue from Lemkin’s Functionalism,17 post-liberals tend to treat social 
collectivities as given, not rent apart by internal cleavages such as class or gender18 and are far too deterministic and 
reductionist in their analysis leaving scant room for agency.  Secondly, the structure of the genos or group is invariably 
perceived as static.  Marx19 on the other hand, was at pains to stress the relational nature of social phenomena combining 
both structure and agency dialectically.  This crucially rescues human agency from a purely structure-centred ontology 
and allows for endogenous change in any structure, including that of a genos.  The Marxist dialectical method perceives 
the social collectivity or what Elias20 calls the social figuration as an irreducible and rich ‘totality’ made up of many 
determinations and relationships dialectically in a constant process of ‘becoming’, in German meaning both ‘coming to 
be’ and ‘ceasing to be’.21  This overcomes Lemkin’s static understanding of culture.  Genocide is therefore the forcible 
disruption or interdiction of the process of cultural change or reproduction of the social figuration.22
A further advantage of Marx’s ontology is that it can explain the forcible disruption or interdiction of the process 
of cultural change through the principle of contradiction and his theory of the political economy of the Capitalist 
MOP,23 locating the instrument of interdiction in the laws of motion of the occupant’s MOP.  It is this instrument that 
will account for the destruction of the Kikuyu’s MOP and thus its entire way of life.  It is for this reason that the label 
of capitalist genocide is apposite.  Moreover, where the post-liberal school merely reveals the global interconnectivity of 
the structure of genocide within a larger chain of global capitalist production and trade, Marx’s approach can explain it 
and thus Britain’s annexation of Kenya and the initial imposition of the capitalist MOP, which ultimately determined 
the forcible disruption and interdiction of the Kikuyu figuration. 
Situation Coloniale
There is one sense in which the case study in this paper is of a type that has been largely neglected in the canon of 
genocide scholarship.  Hopefully, this paper will act as a corrective.  The modality of colonization present in Kenya was 
one in which the native resident population were retained as a ready supply of cheap labour to work on the farms and 
plantations of the white colonists.  In the vast majority of case studies conducted by scholars, the situation coloniale 
did not necessitate the retention of any native labour force, simply the expropriation of native land.  Consequently the 
native population were either physically eliminated or forcibly assimilated via a whole series of gambits that preserved 
and extended the reconstitution of native land into a Lockean form of alienable individual freeholds.24 
16 Wolfe, ‘Settler Colonialism’, p.394.
17 Informed by the anthropology of Bronislaw Malinowski, The Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1944)
18 See Powell, What Do Genocides Kill? pp.528–529.
19 Karl Marx, ‘The eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’, in: Mark Cowling and James Martin (eds.) Marx’s ‘Eighteenth Brumaire’: (post)
modern interpretations. (London: Pluto Press, 2002), p.19.
20 Elias, N. What is Sociology? (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978)
21 Marx, Marxist Methodology.
22 Powell, ‘What Do Genocides Kill?’, p.538.
23 For Marx’s historical materialist theory of society and class struggle as the motor of social change see the preface to Marx, (1971) A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (London: Lawrence and Wishart). It is in Grundisse that we first see in rough form the 
outlines of this theory of the laws of motion of the capitalist MOP later refined in Marx’s Capital, Vol. I (New York: International Publishers, 
1967).
24 Patrick Wolfe, ‘Structure and Event: Settler Colonialism, Time, and the Question of Genocide’, in Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, 
Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History, ed D. Moses (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008)
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The work of Schaller25 is a rare exception to the aforementioned neglect. In both articles he illustrates how Lemkin’s 
formulation can be applied to modalities of colonization such as that in colonial Africa, which he described as African 
type26 where the situation coloniale necessitated the retention of indigenous labour and not just the acquisition of land. 
Therefore the population would have to be preserved as a servile class or ‘allowed to remain’ in Lemkin’s words.27  This 
would have implications for the methods of genocide that were to be employed.  Total physical extermination would 
be impractical and not serve the purposes of the imported land owning white elite; only those techniques that facilitate 
the dispossession and disable the group’s ability to resist would prove suitable.  But the dominant view among genocide 
scholars is that in order to qualify as genocide, cultural destruction must be accompanied by physical destruction.28 
Short repudiated this contention by arguing that upon closer examination of the travaux préparatoires of the UN 
convention, Lemkin’s support for the original draft suggests that he considered cultural destruction to be so grave that 
it should be treated as a crime in its own right.29  More importantly, as will be elucidated below, if we understand the 
genos holistically as an irreducible edifice with multiple facets in a dialectical relationship of symbiosis then cultural 
destruction would fatally cripple the entire structure of the group in question.
The Import of Lemkin
The foundation of Lemkin’s holist ontology is what Brubaker30 termed ‘groupism’.  Tribes, races and nations were 
understood as homogenous collective actors with interests, qualities and agency irreducible to the individuals members 
of the group, and crucially culture was the master concept.31  Furthermore, the social collectivity Lemkin called ‘nation’ 
existed as an organic edifice with biological, cultural, social and economic levels all of which symbiotically depend on 
each other.  Consequently an attack on any level could fatally cripple the entire edifice of the group or cause ‘social 
death’.  This would be consistent with the situation coloniale of the African type as described by Schaller.32
It is in Axis Rule chapter IX that Lemkin delineated the eight techniques of genocide that were employed by 
the Nazis during their occupation of Europe which will be employed in this study of the Kikuyu and the Mau Mau 
rebellion. 33  They are political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious and moral techniques, all of 
which can be read as statement of the multifaceted nature of social collectivities.34
The crucial theoretical import of Lemkin’s work for this thesis is that for him there was an insoluble nexus between 
genocide and colonisation. It is this key passage in Axis Rule in Occupied Europe which confirms the link:
Genocide has two phases: one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group: the other, the 
imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor. This imposition, in turn, may be made upon the oppressed 
population which is allowed to remain, or upon the territory alone, after removal of the population and the 
colonization of the area by the oppressor’s own nationals.35
Genocide for Lemkin involves a two-fold process of destruction of the group life of the native populations and their 
replacement by the colonizing occupants.  A careful treatment of Axis Rule and the History of Genocide shows that the 
structure of his two most important books is held together by the axiomatic girder that genocide and colonization are 
ineluctably bound up with each other. Accordingly, the central proposition in Axis Rule is that genocide flowed from 
the Nazi colonization of eastern and parts of Western Europe.36
If capitalism is understood as necessarily expansionist, its raison d’être to accumulate, and imperialism and 
colonization – a continuation of accumulation and expansion in a new form – a function of structural changes during 
25 See Dominik Schaller, ‘Colonialism and Genocide – Raphael Lemkin’s Concept of Genocide and its Application to European Rule in Africa’, 
Development Dialogue, 50, (2008): 75–93; Dominik Schaller, ‘From Conquest to Genocide: Colonial Rule in German Southwest Africa 
and German East Africa’, in Empire, Colony, Genocide.
26 Schaller distinguishes between three colonial modalities: New England type colonies which entailed the expulsion and annihilation of the 
native population – Australia and North America being the most salient examples – Caribbean type colonies where slaves were imported to 
work on the plantations and African type colonies. See Schaller, From Conquest to Genocide, p.297.
27 Lemkin, Axis Rule, p.79.
28 Dirk Moses, Empire, colony, genocide: keywords and the philosophy of history, in Empire, Colony, Genocide. 
29 Short, ‘Cultural genocide and indigenous peoples’, p.838.
30 Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity without Groups, in Facing Ethnic Conflicts: Towards a New Realism, ed Andres Wimmer, et al. (Lanham MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004), p.35.
31 Short, ‘Cultural genocide and indigenous peoples’, p.837.
32 Schaller, ‘Colonialism and Genocide’; Schaller, ‘From Conquest to Genocide’.
33 Lemkin, Axis Rule, pp.82–90.
34 For the list of techniques see Annex.
35 Lemkin, Axis Rule, p.79.
36 Ibid, ch. IX.
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the late nineteenth century; if we also understand as Lemkin did that colonization was necessarily genocidal then we 
have here the inner connections that elucidate capitalist genocide.
2. The Kikuyu 
The Kikuyu were predominantly a horticultural and agricultural people, herding livestock on land they had cleared 
from forests in the Kikuyu plateau.  The Kikuyu37 as a social and ethnic group can be understood as being structured 
along three organising principles.38  They are lineal, socio-political and economic.  However, these structures or 
figurations39 must be understood to exist in a dialectical relationship of creative tension, both symbiotically interacting 
and affecting each other through time so that they evolve and determine each other.  Underpinning all three structures 
is the economic figuration or the MOP of the Kikuyu.  Unlike Elias’ predilection to perceive all structures as equally 
determining each other which ultimately leads one down a blind sociological alley, illuminating no patterns in society 
or history, it is the assertion of this author that the MOP shapes and delimits (but does not determine in a reductive 
sense) the realm of possible configurations of the other two.40  Marx (1971) understood that it was the MOP or the 
economic structure of society that formed the real basis of society and thus revealed a hierarchy of determinations.41 
Therefore special attention will be paid to the form of property of the Kikuyu as it developed in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. 
 The Lineal Structure
The basic unit of social organisation of the Kikuyu was the family or nyumba, consisting of the father, mother and 
children.42  This could extend into the ‘joint’ family if the father was wealthy enough to support another wife and 
furnish another hut for her to occupy with her children.  Families who had the same provenance aggregated into sub-
clans or mbari, clans or moheregu and ultimately the tribe as a whole.43 
Due to fission, growth and population dispersal, a mbari might encompass an entire village (itura), a fire unit 
(mwaki) or even a ridge (rugongo or riongo).  Consequently mbari solidarity would be strong with disputes being 
resolved on a kinship basis and the village acting as the hub for social and political interaction.44  
With polygamy being the rule, the larger the clan the more sons there were, meaning in turn more livestock, wives 
and offspring.  This was the principle measure of wealth and influence.  There is dispute among scholars about the 
degree to which egalitarianism existed within the Kikuyu, the debate hinging on the nature and distribution of property 
and production relations – which will be elaborated upon below – sufficed to say that there were degrees of inequality.45 
The Socio-Political Figuration
The pivotal mariika figuration acted like a spinal column supporting the entire tribe and acting as a counterweight to 
what Muriuki46 calls the ‘fissiparous’ force of mbari localism, cutting across lineage and territorial groupings.47  This 
figuration is otherwise known as the age-set system, wherein members of the tribe are accorded a status according to 
their age, sex and parenthood48 each stage being given a name or label.  For instance ciana means children, mumo means 
young initiates, anake means warriors, which had a junior and senior stage, and athuri means elders, which also had 
37 The Kikuyu actually further subdivide into three sub-tribes: Metume of Fort Hill, Karura in Kiambu and Gaki in Nyeri (Lambert, 1965, 2).
38 John A. Jackson, Societies, Schools and Progress in Kenya, Ph.D. thesis (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1969).
39 See Elias, ‘What is Sociology?’ and Powell, ‘What Do Genocides Kill?’
40 Elias, What is Sociology? p.15–16.
41 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971)
42 Godfrey Muriuki, A History of the Kikuyu, 1500-1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 110, 1974).
43 Jackson, Societies, Schools and Progress in Kenya, p.14.
44 Muriuki, A History of the Kikuyu, p.112.
45 A large and wealthy clan (or particular mbari and in turn nyumba or family within it) would augment its authority by attracting non-clan or 
alien elements to their fold, in the fashion of a magnet, some eventually being completely absorbed and thus enlarging the clan, while others 
would remain ahoi or simply tenants of the respective property owning clan or mbari. See Muriuki, A History of the Kikuyu,114).  For further 
discussion on this question see Greet Kershaw, Mau Mau From Below. (Oxford: James Currey, 1997), 26-28; 61-68.
46 Muriuki, A History of the Kikuyu, p.16.
47 For an in-depth study of the harmonising and integrative role of age-sets in decentralised tribal societies please consult Shauel N. Eisenstadt, 
African Age Groups: A Comparative Study, Africa, 24 (1) (1954): 100-113; Shauel N. Eisenstadt, From Generation to Generation, Age 
Groups and Social Structure (London: Free Press, 1956).
48 Harold E. Lambert, Kikuyu: Social and Political Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), p.3.
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two stages, judicial and a ritual.49  By the middle of the seventeenth century the mariika was an engrained and durable 
figuration of the Kikuyu.  At each stage the individual members of the tribe had a role or function to perform.  The 
most significant stage socially and politically was the stage of circumcision which symbolised the passing of the young 
into adulthood and the authority of the tribe.  If they failed to pass the initiation they would be barred from marriage 
and having a family of their own. Routledge elaborates:
The festivals and rites associated with both marriage and death hold but a small place in Kikuyu imagination 
compared to that greatest of all ceremonies whereby the boy becomes a man and the girl a woman.50
The young initiates would be grouped into age-sets and all given the same name which they would carry with them for 
the rest of their lives, remaining as they did in the same group until death.  Age-sets would also be grouped together 
to form ‘regiments’ known as riika.51  Succession to a higher status stage, or what Jackson called ‘successively socially-
orientated groups’, was as a group, until the stage of the elder was reached, which would require other qualifying 
prerequisites.52
Riika as well as meaning regiment more generally means generation and it referred to the age-set charged with the 
responsibility of running tribal affairs including political, social and judicial functions, with a term of office and transfer 
of power being marked by the ceremony known as ituika.  This took place every thirty or forty years.
Among the aforementioned functions was included security.  The initiated became warriors, known as the anake 
stage with both a junior grade and senior grade and would remain together as a fighting unit, sometimes being called 
upon by the elders of the clan to fulfil policing functions.53
Girls were not initiated as anake but were instead initiated into junior and senior ranks, the duty of the senior 
girls being to instruct the junior ranks in proper behaviour, relationships, child rearing and sex education.54  After 
initiation, girls were allowed to get married and eventually have a family. Crucially, for both boys and girls, initiation 
was dependant on the payment of goats, vegetables and sometimes honey.  This of course depended on the ownership 
or use of land, with timing of initiation being to some extent dependant on wealth and status.55
The final and perhaps most fundamental socio-political figuration of all were the Kiama or councils.56  Inclusion 
into the councils which existed on local itura, mwaki, riongo and finally clan wide basis was dependant on completion of 
one’s military service (women being barred from the kiama) and marriage to a Kikuyu woman.  Once again, progression 
to the status grade of elder was also dependant on a ‘goat fee’.57
The Kiama was the highest authority in Kikuyuland and was vested with judicial and executive powers.  As with 
the warrior group, the kiama had an inner circle, the senior elders, which possessed predominant power within the 
Kikuyu.  The most important function was arguably their judicial function, where matters of dispute, whether it be 
over theft, misconduct, transgression of behavioural rules, intra-tribal quarrels or worse still murder, were arbitrated 
by members of the kiama.  If the matter concerned local families, it would be settled by the private bench of the 
mbari concerned, but if the matter was of sufficient severity or enveloped a large enough area or involved members of 
sufficiently elevated status, the matter would be passed over to the relevant council, be it village or larger.58
Again we find that the judicial system hinged on the payment of a fee whether as a litigant in order to have ones 
case heard59 or as compensation and recompense for the infraction paid to the plaintiff.60  Consequently, the size of a 
49 Jackson, Societies, Schools and Progress in Kenya, p.16. For an exhaustive delineation of all terms denoting age and’ status refer to Lambert, 
Kikuyu: Social and Political Institutions, pp.3–7.
50 William S. Routledge and Katherine P. Routledge, With a Prehistoric People, the Akikuyu of British East Africa (London, E. Arnold, 1910), 
p.154.
51 Lambert, Kikuyu: Social and Political Institutions, 8; Kershaw, Mau Mau From Below, p.68. 
52 Jackson, Societies, Schools and Progress in Kenya, p.15.
53 For a comprehensive breakdown of the extensive duties and functions performed by the Kikuyu warrior group see Lambert, Kikuyu: Social 
and Political Institutions, pp.69-72, Kershaw, Mau Mau From Below, pp.68–70 and Muriuki, A History of the Kikuyu, pp.119–121.
54 Muriuki, A History of the Kikuyu p.122.
55 Kershaw, Mau Mau From Below, p.68.
56 For the organisation of Kiama see Stanley K. Gathigira, Miikarire ya Agikuyu, (London, Sheldon Press, 1952), 63-68; T G. Benson, Kikuyu-
English Dictionary, ed  T G. Benson (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1964), pp.6–7; A W. McGregor (1909) Kikuyu and Its People, Church 
Missionary Review, 60, 1909), p.34; Lambert, Kikuyu: Social and Political Institutions, ch 9.
57 Muriuki, A History of the Kikuyu, p.126. This is perhaps underscored by the fact that the junior and senior councils were called ‘council 
of one goat’ and council of two goats’ respectively. See Ibid, p.127. It was only once the eldest son of a family had been circumcised and 
initiated, thus discarding the period of childhood, could a man make the transition to the full status of junior elder. However, the rite of 
passage symbolised by the ceremony of circumcision was itself dependant on the payment of a goat.
58 For a detailed and elaborate discussion of the Kikuyu justice system see Lambert, Kikuyu: Social and Political Institutions, pp.107–142; 
Muriuki, A History of the Kikuyu, pp.127–131.
59 See Lambert, Kikuyu: Social and Political Institutions, p.109; Muriuki, A History of the Kikuyu p.129.
60 See Lambert, Kikuyu: Social and Political Institutions, p.113; Muriuki, A History of the Kikuyu p.131.
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families holding in land and thus their ability to herd livestock and grow other foodstuffs would confer a commensurate 
degree of influence and power in the various kiama and status grades.  Thus what we see is the fault lines of power and 
class, the seedbeds of inequity, hierarchy and oppression.  This strikes a discordant note alongside what Middleton has 
described as chauvinistic assertions of egalitarianism so often claimed by ethnographers of the Kikuyu.61  It is to this 
bedrock of any society, what Marx called the ‘economic base’ that we now turn.
The Economic Figuration
Traditionally, the Kikuyu had employed a system of property ownership that revolved around the principle of ‘first 
clearing’ wherein ownership was decided by those who had cleared the forests first.  According to Kenyatta this was 
not a system of private property as such.62  It was only with the migration south from Mount Kenya in the middle of 
the nineteenth century and the purchase of land from the Dorobo tribe that a new form of property ownership came 
to predominate, namely one of private property.63  The Dorobo were primarily hunter-gatherers and thus were happy 
to sell the land to the Kikuyu.  When the purchase was made, the Kikuyu were essentially buying the right of ‘first 
clearing’ from the Dorobo. 64  This system became known as gethaka meaning ‘land’ or ‘estate’.65  The one caveat to this 
picture is that the land was also owned by the family or nyumba as a whole, but this did not equate with communal or 
tribal land.66  Dr. Leakey, who is one of the foremost scholars on the Kikuyu concurred in his testimony to the Kenya 
Land Commission, insisted that there was no tribal tenure, the Kikuyu ‘sticking together’ only as far as political matters 
were concerned.67
Moreover, as explained earlier, given the polygamous nature of Kikuyu society, a family could be connected with 
many other families, and ultimately through kinship relations aggregated geographically into a homestead or mocie, 
village or itura or even a ridge or rugongo.  Thus, a wealthy family head could spread his influence far and wide through 
the kinship system.68
Thus we see that within the kiama system, those families with significant land holdings and thus formidable 
capacities to furnish cattle and other food stuffs would be accorded greater access and influence on the kiama councils, 
with of course the need to pay fees to ascend the ranks of the kiama system being an obligatory precondition.69 
Therefore, we have the conditioning of the Kiama figuration by the MOP.70  The kiama system fulfils key political, 
social and judicial functions and therefore can perhaps be better characterised as the ‘social relations of kinship’.  Thus 
the social relations of kinship can be seen by the end of the nineteenth century to possess in embryonic form certain 
class characteristics.  What we have here is the MOP shaped by the conditions of social production determining the 
social relations of kinship in the kiama system.
As with the evolution of socio-political structures and the emergence of the kiama system we see the rise of a 
new system of land tenure and property affected by the interaction of tribes and the demographic expansion into new 
terrains. In other words, a dialectical interplay of exogenous and endogenous factors, both between figurations within 
the kikuyu – the socio-political figuration of the mbari and the economic figuration of land tenure - and between 
61 John Middleton, The Kikuyu and Kamba of Kenya, (London, International African Institute, 1953), p.99. 
62 Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mt. Kenya, (London, Secker and Warburg, 1938), p.26.
63 Martin L. Kilson, ‘Land and the Kikuyu: A Study of the Relationship between Land and Kikuyu Political Movements’, The Journal of Negro 
History, 40 (2), (1955): 103–153, p.105.
64 Kenyatta, J. (1938) Facing Mt. Kenya, p.27.
65 Ibid, pp.21–22.
66 Ibid,  p.31.
67 Kenya Land Commission, Report of Kenya Land Commission: Evidence and Memoranda, Vol. I. Colonial No. 91, (London, HMSO, 1934), 
p.679.
68 The significance of establishing the private nature of land tenure is that it can explain why and how some families could manage to amass 
greater status, wealth and influence than others. If we imagine a system of communal property, administered by a tribal council in an 
egalitarian fashion, possibilities for accumulating wealth are severely restricted as logically no lineage or mbari house can pass on land and 
property to successive generations. Therefore, possibilities for accumulation of power, wealth and influence are restricted to that which can 
be achieved in a single generation. In fact this potential was greatly expanded by the decline in power of the rival tribal group the Masai 
and the growing incursion of Arab and Swahili traders and from 1888 the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) from the eastern 
coast which resulted in growth and extension of trade links with the Kikuyu accumulating notables. See Bruce Berman, Control and Crisis in 
Colonial Kenya: The Dialectic of Domination, (London, James Currey, 1990), p.50. Here is a clear example of cultural diffusion. The arrival 
of the IBEAC entailed the voluntary exchange of culture leading to changes in the Kikuyu figuration. For the growth in the differentiation 
of the Kikuyu and the rise of class inequalities see John F. Munro, Colonial Rule and the Kamba: Social Change in the Kenya Highlands, 
1889–1939, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975).
69 Kershaw, Mau Mau From Below, pp.65–66.
70 This is not to say that the Kiama figuration was entirely shaped and structured by the MOP, as it in fact prefigured it by roughly two 
centuries, Nevertheless, the rise of a new form of property ownership and the attendant new relations of production did influence and 
condition the inherited Kiama structure.
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figurations of different tribes, in this case between the Kikuyu, the Masai and the Dorobo.  As argued above, the 
conservative and essentialist account of social structure informed by the social anthropology of Malinowski would 
struggle to explain such change and evolution through time.  The example of the Kikuyu serves to underscore the 
necessity to augment Lemkin’s understanding of social structures with a mechanism that can account for such change 
lest we mistake it for cultural destruction.  It is here that Marx’s ontology can best explain conflict, class and in a non-
reductionist manner rank a hierarchy of determinations, giving it an unmatched explanatory power.  By employing 
a Marxist methodology a clearer distinction between cultural diffusion and cultural destruction can be made in the 
evolution of Kikuyu figurations.
What must be understood at this stage is that if the Kikuyu suffered any attenuation, restriction or depravation 
of land ownership then their ability to rear cattle and other foodstuffs is undermined.  This in turn would lead to the 
stymieing of the ability of Kikuyu tribesmen and women to perform initiation ceremonies, progress through the various 
status grades, rear a family and of course ultimately enter the stage of elders and partake in the political and social 
organisation of their society.71  In other words it would inflict a fatal blow on their ability to practise their culture.72 
Jackson concurred:
any significant loss of land by the Kikuyu people, in addition to threatening their basic means of subsistence 
would threaten a fundamental aspect of the foundation of their socio-cultural system.73
3. The Unleashing of Capitalist Genocide
The genocide of the Kikuyu would not have taken place but for the operation of socio-economic and geo-political 
structures that extended far beyond the boundaries of Kenya itself.  Therefore it is necessary to analyse those structures 
that led to the British government’s involvement in and colonisation of Kenya and established the situation coloniale. 
Ergo an analysis that illuminates the global dimension will be outlined in order to draw attention to the larger socio-
economic and political forces that conditioned the colonization of Kenya and the resultant genocidal process.  This 
provides a mechanism that can demonstrate Lemkin’s assertion that Genocide and colonization are ineluctably bound 
up with each other.  More specifically, this latter connection will help explicate the imposition of the foreign MOP on 
the Kikuyu. 
Once the inner connection with larger global socio-economic and geo-political forces has been established the 
analysis will proceed to the genocidal process itself which can be schematically divided into two phases: The first 
began with the alienation of Kikuyu land by the British Crown and their forced resettlement to the Highland reserves 
and the coeval process of marginalisation and economic disenfranchisement of those Kikuyu who became known as 
squatters.  With the onset of the largely Kikuyu led resistance – dubbed as Mau Mau by the colonists and colonial 
administrators74 – and the consequent imposition by the British colonial authorities of the emergency laws during the 
state of emergency, a second more concentrated and egregious phase of the genocidal process began.75
The geo-political context
In searching for a theoretical apparatus that could explain Britain’s foreign policy and imperial ambitions, none proved 
to be as astute and penetrating as Marxism.  A Marxist theory of imperialism76 is apposite because ontologically it 
can account for the laws of motion of the capitalist MOP and thus explain the drive to ‘carve up the world’ in the 
late nineteenth century not as one solely derived from the operation of interstate competition in the reductionist 
71 See Kenyatta, Facing Mt. Kenya, p.26; William S. Routledge and Katherine P. Routledge, With a Prehistoric People, p.154.
72 Kilson, ‘Land and the Kikuyu’, p.104.
73 Jackson, Societies, Schools and Progress in Kenya, p.103.
74 John Newsinger, The Blood Never Dried, (London: Bookmarks, 2006), p.186.
75 For a detailed analysis of the political economy of Kenya from the beginning of colonial rule to independence see Berman, Control and Crisis 
in Colonial Kenya. For an analysis of the Mau Mau resistance see Donald Barnett, and Karari Njama, Mau Mau From Within, (London, 
Macgibbon & Kee, 1966). For an interpretation of the Mau Mau as Kenya’s first national movement see Carl G. Rosberg and John C. 
Nottingham, The Myth of Mau Mau: Nationalism in Kenya, (New York, Praeger, 1966). For a Marxist analysis of the Mau Mau see Maina 
W. Kinyatti, Thunder from the Mountains – Mau Mau Patriotic Songs, (London, Zed Press, 1980) and Maina W. Kinyatti, Mau Mau: A 
Revolution Betrayed, (London, Mau Mau Research Center, 2000). For the Mau Mau as a peasant war see Wunjabari O. Maloba, Mau Mau 
and Kenya: An Analysis of a Peasant Revolt, (Oxford, Indiana University Press, 1993).
76 For a discussion of the various permutations of Marxist theories of imperialism see Alex Callinicos, Imperialism and Global Political Economy, 
(Cambridge, Polity Press, 2009): chs.1–2.
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vein of realism,77 or commit an equally reductionist faux pas and attribute it to the realm of ideas in the manner of 
constructivism,78 nor struggle to explain it at all as liberal internationalism79 does. An ontology which is grounded in 
materialist axioms which is yet not reduced to them is crucial to understanding the world if we are to take seriously 
the assumption that the world is intelligible with discernible patterns and a hierarchy of determinations. A Marxist 
theory of imperialism that avoids the pitfalls of economic reductionism will be employed, taking its cue from the 
formulation posited by Callinicos and Harvey wherein two levels of analysis are employed.80 There are two ‘logics of 
power’ dialectically interacting but distinct. Firstly, economic competition or the politics of production, exchange and 
accumulation81 and secondly, the logic of geo-political competition or what Harvey terms the territorialist logic of 
state. The advantage of this approach is that it avoids a reduction to either level. Furthermore, this approach as espoused 
by Callinicos makes a virtue of not attempting to construct an ‘ahistorical’, universal theory of imperialism but one that 
is couched in a reading of the historically specific conjuncture. In other words, one that recognises the particular phase 
in the development of capitalism(s). Not all capitalist powers embodied the same model of capitalism.82
Between 1873 and 1896 the world economy experienced what is commonly known as the ‘Great Depression’.83 
Arrighi compares this to what he describes as the ‘long downturn’ of the twentieth century, both periods characterised 
by intensified competition and stagnation.84  In the last few decades of the nineteenth century Marxist economists have 
argued that the global economy suffered from a system-wide crisis of profitability determined by the rising organic 
composition of capital and a consequent deleterious effect on the rate of profit.85  The response of Britain was distinct. 
Unlike the organised capitalisms of Germany and the US, where a state led process of cartelisation and rationalisation 
took place, Britain preserved the relatively decentralized business structures that had arisen during the industrial 
revolution and instead embarked on phase of overseas investment, from £700 million in 1870 to £2 billion by 1900, 
upwards of £4 billion by 1913.86  Critically, the growing expansion of US manufacturing exports and increasing 
competition from the US and Germany in Latin America, and a consequent relative decline in Britain’s competitiveness 
compelled Britain to abandon its ‘imperialism of free trade’ and foster her growing surpluses with India and the new 
colonies in Africa.87  What we see here at work is the operation of the structural logic of a socioeconomic system shaping 
the world economy, forging a world division of labour that ensnared agricultural suppliers of food and raw materials.
The global economic context was set for Britain’s intrusion into the West African region that would come to be 
known as Kenya. This was the beginning of what has become known as ‘the scramble for Africa’,88 so called because 
it entailed the movement of the great powers of Europe to carve up Africa.89  This began at the Congress of Berlin of 
1884–1885 where the division of Africa into forty odd countries that paid no heed to ethnic groupings would later 
serve the template for the modern states of present day Africa.  Britain would assume control of the Eastern African 
Protectorate in 1886 in a deal concluded with Germany and the Sultan of Zanzibar (Moon, 1973).90  But why did 
Britain annex what was known at the time as the East African Protectorate, in addition to all of its other colonial 
dependencies?  Britain at the time was concerned that French inroads into Eastern Africa towards the Nile and German 
encroachment south of the British foothold of Mombasa on the coast would ultimately pose a risk to their control of 
the Suez Canal which was pivotal to Britain’s access to the trade routes to India and more specifically the captive market 
77 For the classic foundational structural Realist text see Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, McGraw-Hill Higher 
Education, 1979).
78 For a constructivist theory of international relations see Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction 
of Power Politics, International Organisation 46, (2) 1992, pp.391–425 and Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999).
79 Liberal internationalism cannot capture the distinct laws of motion of the capitalist MOP, given its dependence on a Smithsonian or 
neo-Ricardian political economy and what the great historian E.H. Car called its ‘wishful vision of universal free trade’ with its alleged but 
empirically unsubstantiated harmonising and pacifying effects. See Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939: an Introduction 
to the study of International Relations, (London, Macmillan, 1946). It has thus struggled to account for the failure of ‘free trade’ and liberal 
democracy to banish economic crises, wars and geo-political competition. For a collection of essays on the theory of Liberal Internationalism 
see Michael W. Doyle, Liberal Peace: Selected Essays, (New York, Routledge, 2011).
80 Callinicos, Imperialism and Global Political Economy; David Harvey, The New Imperialism, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003).
81 For the laws of motion of the capitalist MOP see Marx, Capital Vol 1; Ben Fine, Marx’s Capital, 3rd ed, (London, MacMillan Press, 1989).
82  Callinicos expounds on the various models of capitalisms embodied by the various capitalist powers and proceeds to delineate a 
periodization of imperialism. Imperialism therefore exhibited a variety of structures and dynamics both within and across temporal phases. 
See Ibid, ch 45.
83 Ibid, 153.
84 Giovanni Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing: lineages of the twenty-first century, (London, Verso, 2007), pp.116–120.
85 Chris Harman, Explaining the Crisis, (London, Bookmarks, 1984), pp.51–54.
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for British industrial goods that India represented.91 If the Suez was choked off or worse still annexed by a rival power, 
then access to the markets of India and the Far East would be cut off. In an effort to keep hold of  this territory, the 
British government would encourage immigration, namely white settlers and thus wittingly or otherwise, set in train a 
series of events that would lead to the formation and imposition of a foreign or ‘settler/estate’ MOP.
And so we see the intersection of economic and geo-political competition in the context of a global economy 
that by the last third of the nineteenth century may not have been fully capitalist but nonetheless was knitted together 
through an interlocking nexus of trade and investment under the hegemonic sway of the capitalist MOP92located in 
the western hemisphere with Britain standing at its apex.93  This was facilitated by the rise of key technologies such as 
rail and steam power and most importantly driven by the ceaseless and insatiable, competitive drive to accumulate – 
which Marx observed was the raison d’être of capitalism.94  It is at this intersection that we find the global mechanisms 
that conditioned Britain’s intervention in Kenya which would have disastrous genocidal consequences for the Kikuyu.
Phase 1: Land and Labour
The formation of the colonial state in Kenya was a volatile, contradictory and haphazard one95 but in its essence it 
involved the drive to link European capital with indigenous societies and seize effective control of African labour 
and production.96  This process has been described by Marxists as a process of articulation where two different and 
often inimical and incompatible MOPs are weaved together leading to the uprooting, dislocation, transformation and 
paradoxically destruction and preservation of the figurations of indigenous societies.
In its attempts to forge these linkages the colonial state faced a dilemma; a veritable imbroglio.  It had to contend 
with and manage the contradictory pressures of settler and peasant production, the demands of the metropole and the 
need to secure both a material base for its continued reproduction and a degree of legitimation amongst all those within 
its territory.  It was a fundamental doctrine of British colonial policy that colonial possessions remain economically 
and fiscally self-sufficient.97  It therefore had to both foster the development of a political economy that could raise the 
necessary revenue to secure its continued material reproduction and meet metropolitan demands to integrate into the 
chain of world trade and thus reap dividends for the metropolitan treasury.  The latter pressure was a manifestation of 
what was earlier referred to as the structural logic of the global socioeconomic system.  Furthermore it had to secure 
legitimation amongst the subject population.  These demands would prove not to be compatible.  After initially 
sponsoring the development of indigenous peasant production, given the latter’s initial success in reaping significant 
agricultural product for export and thus provision of a significant proportion of tax revenue as well serving the second 
objective of securing legitimation among some sections of the native population98 for a colonial state that was groping 
for some permanent material basis to furnish its continued reproduction.99  It also served the state’s second fundamental 
objective which was to secure legitimation.100
However, with the continued arrival of white settlers and metropolitan concessionaires, the political pressure that 
mounted ‘progressively undermined the colonial state’s control over the terms of development’.101  What would ensue 
was the pernicious penetration of the Kikuyu MOP by settler production leading to the fatal crippling of the former 
and its ability to reproduce itself. In other words the end of what Berman called the ‘autarky of precapitalist production 
[emphasis added]’ via the monetization of some parts of the production process.102  Nevertheless, given the importance 
91 P J. Cain, and G A. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688-1914, (London, Longman, 1993): p.334.
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93 S B. Saul, Studies in British Overseas Trade, 1870–1914, (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 1960)
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96 Ibid, 34–35.
97 See Elkins, Britain’s Gulag, p.7; Berman, Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya, p.52.
98 It is a fundamental Marxist precept that a colonial or capitalist state cannot be seen to act in the exclusive or corporate interest of one class 
lest it risk being exposed as an instrument of class oppression and thus provokes rebellion and sedition. See Berman, Control and Crisis in 
Colonial Kenya, ch.1.
99 Ibid, p.54.
100 Fostering indigenous peasant production helped the colonial state  carve out political support by giving favourable economic terms and 
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101 Berman, Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya, p.37.
102 Ibid, p.37. It must be stressed at this point that the destruction of the Kikuyu MOP was not uniform and that in fact some elements were 
transformed into nascent centres of commodity production for the market and thus the imposition of a foreign MOP led to the emergence 
of an internal transition towards capitalism, unleashing yet another contradiction between two competing capitalist MOPs with Kenya . See 
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of the need to secure legitimation and the fact that the Kikuyu MOP was still an important adjunct to the continued 
reproduction of the settler MOP through the medium of articulation – as will be shown below – this meant that there 
were limits to how far the Kikuyu MOP could be ‘transformed’ before the structures of articulation began to decay and 
thus undermine the continued reproduction of settler MOP.  Therefore the colonial state ‘laboured under a palimpsest 
of contradictions of accumulation and control’.103 
In order to furnish the need for land and cheap labour that settler production so desperately required, the colonial 
state embarked on a form of what Marx described as primitive accumulation.104  To achieve these aims the colonial state 
introduced a complex set of laws and regulations.  Firstly, the colonial state embarked on a massive programme of land 
alienation and the forcible relocation of the dispossessed Kikuyu as well as all other ethnic groups to ‘labour reserves’, 
equivalent to the homelands in South Africa under apartheid or the Native American reserves in the United States.105 
The laws alienating huge swathes of Kikuyu land which were forcibly imposed on the Kikuyu were varied and complex, 
ultimately culminating after eight years of bitter and protracted negotiation in the Crown Lands Ordinance in 1915.106 
The latter completely nullified Kikuyu land rights and created a free market in land in the ‘White Highlands’ as they 
now became known.  Previous laws had paid lip service to protecting the rights of Kikuyu to ‘occupy’ their land107 but 
ultimately the decisive influence in the shift to total land expropriation was the influence of ‘big capital’ from Europe 
and the key financial role it would play in stimulating land purchases and development.108  Again we see the larger 
global structures at play.  Given the precarious state of the colonial states finances this was financial leverage that it 
could not afford to resist.  Ultimately the Kikuyu would lose upwards of sixty thousand acres to the settlers (Elkins, 
2005, p.12).109  In Axis Rule Lemkin described this as the political technique of genocide, in that it imposed the national 
pattern of the colonisers by way of removing the occupied peoples and their property – in this case the land of the 
Kikuyu – and allocating it to the settlers. 110
The reserves, which were the natural corollary of the ‘land grab’, were located in the Central Province districts of 
Kiambu, Fort Hill, and Nyeri.  Over time the conditions in the reserves deteriorated due to severe overcrowding, to 
such an extent that a Kikuyu family would struggle to meet their basic subsistence needs. Commenting on the degree 
of overpopulation in the reserves Professor Buell observed:
A District Commissioner testified in 1919 that the density of population in Kikuyu reserve land between 
Nairobi and Limoru was about four hundred to the square mile and that population was increasing there. 
‘This density of population is from five to seven times as great as in the South African Reserves where they 
are increasing the native holdings…’ In Nyeri and Fort Hall reserves the population is about two hundred 
and twelve per square mile.111
In a memorandum submitted to the Kenya Land Commission the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) were moved to 
comment on the abject state of land provision for the Kikuyu
some of the districts in our province break the record of the density of the world population of any agricultural 
people and occupy perhaps third place in the record of the density of the world population notwithstanding 
the fact that our country is a purely agricultural country...112
Meek added that in 1944 ‘density figures of 1,100 and even 1,800 to the square mile have been reported’.113
It is inconceivable that under such deleterious conditions the Kikuyu could furnish the necessary livestock to 
support the various cultural practises detailed above, let alone support their respective progression through initiation 
and the various status grades, which was so critical to the Kikuyu way of Life. Kilson succinctly observed:
Kikuyu society would be well-nigh impossible without an adequate supply of land upon which these animals 
could graze. And, if one would couple this with the fact that extensive farming is another major aspect of 
103 Lonsdale and Berman, Coping with the Contradictions, p.491.
104 Marx, Capital, Vol. I, ch 26–27.
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107 Kilson , Land and the Kikuyu, pp.111–113.
108 Berman, Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya, pp.56–57.
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112 Kenya Land Commission, p.200.
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Kikuyu society, one might conclude that to alienate land from the Kikuyus would be tantamount to setting 
their socio-cultural system on the road to total disintegration.114
This would be compounded to egregious and tragic levels when during the second world war, the colonial government 
ordered the local administration in the reserves to force an increase in peasant production for the war effort, a complete 
volte face on the aggressive discouragement of peasant production in previous decades.  The consequence was to subject 
the land to such a strain as to threaten ecological meltdown and thus imperil the existence of all who lived off the 
reserves.115  Thus we observe the technique of the destruction of the foundation of economic existence.  The effects of 
the British land policy eerily chime with Lemkin’s observation in Axis Rule:
The destruction of the foundations of the economic existence of a national group necessarily brings about a 
crippling of its development, even retrogression.  The lowering of the standards of living creates difficulties 
in fulfilling cultural-spiritual requirements.  Furthermore, a daily fight literally for bread and for physical 
survival may handicap thinking in both general and national terms.116
That the land policy exhibited forcible dimensions is again manifestly undeniable, given that at no point were the 
Kikuyu given a genuinely democratic opportunity to challenge the process of land alienation.  What they were given 
was a feeble and ineffectual platform to voice their opposition at the Kenya Land Commission (known popularly as 
the Carter Commission).117  This eventuated in the granting of an additional 30.5 square miles of territory and 350 
squares miles for future use.  Alas, the land offered was agriculturally arid, barren and unfertile.118  The reason for this 
was that the colonial secretary instructed the Carter Commission to not provide any fertile land from the ‘White’ 
Highlands.119  These measures prosecuted by the colonial government cannot be taken to be what Short described as 
sufficient measures to assist the transition from one socio-economic and political figuration to another.120  Clearly we 
have evidence for the social decay and pathological dissolution of the Kikuyu economic foundation that could only 
eventuate in the destruction of the socio-political figuration.  Therefore, these physical conditions could only lead to 
the ruination of the social life of the Kikuyu and amount to cultural and physical genocide.
Secondly, the colonial government imposed a hugely burdensome ‘hut tax’ and ‘poll tax’ collectively equivalent to 
two months wages at the local rate.121  The combined effect of the land and tax policy was to force Kikuyu migration 
in search of work and land. This conditioned the rise of what had become known as the squatter community, and the 
dispersal of tens of thousands of Kikuyu tribesman in search of living on settler farms and plantations. 122  By 1945 
there were 200,000 registered squatters in the White Highlands, the vast majority of whom were Kikuyu.123  The effect 
was to further disintegrate the tribal figuration with all the attendant genocidal effects that would accompany it.124 
In a submission to the Kenya Land Commission Jomo Kenyatta, who would later become the first post-independence 
Kenyan president, remarked on the effect of the land policy and the consequent Kikuyu migration:
We find we have not only lost land, but we have also lost tribesmen, because some of the Kikuyu ran away 
when their land was taken, and they have become squatters... We consider that this is a matter which [has] 
been a great disadvantage to the Kikuyu people because it has disorganized the tribe.125
Thirdly, in an effort to combat the initial success of those Kikuyu who were resourceful enough to escape the 
draconian strictures of the new settler colonial economy or who were among the fortunate few to have enough land 
in the central province reserves to produce a surplus of agricultural goods which they sold on the expanding internal 
markets, the colonial government imposed a prohibition on the growing of the most profitable crops. Other crops like 
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maize would be controlled and restricted by marketing boards established after the Second World War retarding African 
agriculture. This of course turned the screw further on the Kikuyu way of life.
The final screw in the first phase, before the advent of the Mau Mau insurrection itself, would come with the 
advent of the compulsory labour policy brought into being by the ‘Northey Circular’ in 1919, so named after General 
Northey the colonial governor at the time; although this merely obliged the district commissioners to force through 
what the land and tax policy had compelled most of the Kikuyu on the reserves to do out of material necessity. 
Nevertheless, in this telling remark in the Kenya Gazette, the Governor revealed not only the racist contempt for the 
Kikuyu that was common among colonial administrators and the settler classes but also the inner connections between 
global political-economic structures, British capitalism more specifically and the settler MOP:
Is it our duty to allow these natives to remain in uneducated and unproductive idleness in their so-called 
Reserves? I think not. I believe that our duty is to encourage the energies of all communities to produce from 
these rich lands the raw products and foodstuffs that the world at large, and the British Empire in particular, 
require [emphasis added]. This can only be done by encouragement of the thousands of able-bodied natives 
to work with the European settler for the cultivation of the land.126
In political-economic terms, the net effect of the articulation of the indigenous peasant and settler MOPs on the 
Kikuyu – embodied in the land, tax and labour policy – was to ensure that ‘the material conditions of reproduction 
in the reserves were insufficient to meet the needs of simple reproduction, commodity purchases, and tax payments 
[emphasis added]’.127  These were the mechanisms that forced the Kikuyu onto the labour market.  But given the paltry 
nature of the wages paid on the settler farms plus the meagre prices paid for the surplus product sold by the Kikuyu 
peasants – due to the aforementioned marketing boards – it was necessary to stop short of completely annihilating the 
Kikuyu MOP and thus allow the latter to make up the shortfall in what Berman described as the resulting ‘reproductive 
gap’. This allowed the Kikuyu to be paid below the value of commodity labour power and their cash crops.128 
Tragically, the ‘reproductive gap’ was, as has been revealed above, far from adequately filled.  As Barta reminded us 
in his analysis of another example of colonial settler society, Australia, colonization established two ‘incompatible forms 
of society and economy’, in its quest to forcibly incorporate indigenous society in to the orbit of the global capitalist 
economy.129  The alienation of land had genocidal consequences for the Aboriginal peoples.  Barta thus understood 
genocidal intent as inherent in the policy of the metropolitan government, the local colonial authorities – in Kenya 
both the colonial governor all the way down to the district commissioners – and the settlers themselves to take the land 
even when the horrific human consequences – the crippling poverty, the breakdown of their culture and the dissolution 
of the Kikuyu group – were foreseeable.  Thus the inner connections that elucidate capitalist genocide have been 
revealed in the corrosive articulation of two inimical MOPs, conditioned by the laws of motion of the global capitalist 
MOP and geo-political competition specific to capitalism at the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  With the 
rise of the Mau Mau rebellion, the genocide would enter its second phase.
Phase 2: The Concentrated Shock of Genocide Behind the Wire
By the early 1950s popular discontent on the reserves, in the White Highlands and in the urban centres, particularly 
Nairobi, now filled with dispossessed squatters and impoverished peasants from the reserves looking for work, was 
reaching fever pitch.  The growth in popularity of the the main nationalist political group opposed to British rule, the 
Kenya Africa Union (KAU), and its leader Jomo Kenyatta and the extension of the influence of radical trade unions 
caused great consternation for the colonial authorities.130  Governor Baring in a letter to London was moved to state 
that in declaring a state of emergency the colonial government was not overacting because ‘Kenyatta has succeeded 
building up right under the nose of authority a powerful organisation affecting all sides of life among the Kikuyu’.131 
Consequently in the early months of 1953, Governor Baring empowered his government with a wide range of extreme 
and draconian laws, known as ‘emergency regulations’. These included everything from communal punishment, control 
of individual and mass movements, control and disposition of labour, confiscation of property and land, the censorship 
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of all kikuyu publications, disbanding of all kikuyu opposition parties, suspension of due process132 and detention 
without trial.133  The last six would all be candidates for Lemkin’s genocidal techniques: equating with economic, 
cultural and social.  Given the limitations on the scope of this paper, three outstanding genocidal techniques have 
been focussed on due to their pivotal role in waging war against Kikuyu society in its entirety and its efficaciousness in 
ensuring that ‘the colonised had no appreciable collective life at all’.134
The concentrated form of genocide made possible by the autocratic and tyrannical power unleashed by the state 
of emergency can be schematically broken down into the colonial strategy of repatriation, detention and villageization: 
all amounted to forcing the Kikuyu population into a condition of virtual isolation and severance, behind the wire as 
Elkins so aptly described it, from the Mau Mau guerrillas.  This form of warfare was a logical correlate of waging a war 
against an entire people.  With almost the entire Kikuyu population of 1.5 million having taken the Mau Mau oath 
which united the Kikuyu in a bond of solidarity and a solemn pledge to defeat the injustices of British colonial rule, 
the assessment and fear of the colonial authorities that they were in fact contending with the resistance of an entire 
community was an understandable one.135
The only way to defeat a movement organically and insolubly woven into the fabric of a society is to bring about 
the dissolution of that society.  Sartre echoed this sentiment when he argued that with the mobilisation of an entire 
people and the inevitable breakdown in the traditional distinction between civilians and combatants, the only way a 
colonial power could defeat a guerrilla army was to wage a war against that society in its entirety.136  Ironically, in the 
same essay he made the pertinent distinction between this scenario and colonial modalities where it was necessary 
to retain the native population as a pliant and cheap source of labour. In the case of Kenya we have both modalities 
embodied in the two phases respectively.  The last phase was to be the most brutal and most destructive. 
The nettle of contradictions that the colonial state wrestled with were to reach their most volatile expression during 
the state of emergency.  The struggle to both secure the reproduction of the settler MOP and legitimation was to prove 
beyond the reach of the colonial authorities.  With the rise of resistance which ultimately stemmed from the imposition 
of the foreign MOP, the state dispensed with the pretence of neutrality and waged a total social war on Kikuyu society.
Repatriation
The first broadside against the Kikuyu tribe in the genocidal war, otherwise described as a ‘counter-insurgency 
operation’ by the colonial authorities, was to forcibly repatriate most of the Kikuyu population living outside the 
reserves, particularly Kikuyu squatters, back to the Kikuyu districts.137  The deportations began in December 1952. 
They were largely packed into railcars and lorries and shipped back to the overcrowded reserves, thus compounding 
the problem of land shortages and aggravating conditions of existence already crippling by any reasonable measure. 
By May of 1953 over 100,000 had been forcibly removed from their homes on the predicate that in amongst the 
gargantuan volume of humanity coerced into leaving what little was left of their life, some may in fact be Mau Mau.138 
In a half-hearted attempt to cope with the flow of human traffic, the colonial government established ‘transit camps’ 
to help process the internally displaced as they had now become.  The conditions in the camps were squalid and 
overcrowded with threadbare sanitation, no clean water and little in the way of food.  To exacerbate the problem, the 
Kikuyu could not afford to purchase any food as they had lost all their livestock or not been compensated their lost 
wages as a result of forced deportation.  Malnutrition, starvation and disease were the inevitable outcome.139  Instead 
the colonial government leaned heavily on the Red Cross for medical assistance and food.  Many languished in the 
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transit camps for months because there simply was not enough land on the reserves to accommodate them, land which 
was on the verge of ecological collapse. 
In a telling admission Governor Baring and his ministers admitted that the reserves could not accommodate any 
more Kikuyu as the reserves were ‘saturated’.  During a debate on the Kenya Legislative council, a representative body 
made up mostly of white settlers with a third of the seats left over for Indians and Arabs and no seats for Africans – it 
was made quite clear that the forced deportations and repatriations to the reserves were seen as punishment for the 
rebellion precisely because they were overcrowded and lacked food.140  These admissions and outright declamatory 
protestations are suggestive of intent in the narrow legal sense. 
Both in the transit camps and the reserves the ‘repatriates’ were forced to contend with conditions of existence that 
would foreseeably lead to their physical ruination.  Lemkin observed that one technique for the prosecution of physical 
genocide was engineering environmental conditions that would endanger health.  Lemkin elaborated: ‘undesired 
national groups... are deprived of elemental necessities for preserving health and life’.141  Arguably the conditions in the 
transit camps and those in the reserves that were further exacerbated by the policy of repatriation qualify as conditions 
that endanger health and can thus be seen as genocidal.
Detention, Screening and the ‘Pipeline’
In an effort to weed out those who were considered sympathetic to the Mau Mau the colonial state engineered a policy 
of ‘screening’ where tens of thousands of suspects were detained without trial and interrogated to ‘extract’ intelligence 
and identify loyalists who would later be allowed to return to the reserves.  By the end of 1953 eight screening 
camps were set up throughout the Rift Valley province.142  However most of the screening took place on temporary 
interrogation sites by roving interrogation teams in farms or police stations. Just fourteen months into the emergency 
and 153,000 arrests had already been made.143  This egregious abuse of power and human rights was made unspeakable 
by the methods of interrogation employed. ‘Techniques’ of interrogation ‘included slicing ears off, boring holes in ears 
drums, flogging until death, pouring paraffin over suspects who were then set alight, and burning ear drums with lit 
cigarettes’ as well as castration and rape.144  In the screening camps themselves the techniques differed very little: torture 
and death by beatings was commonplace.145
The governments drive to liquidate the Kikuyu leadership and its organisation would step up a gear with the 
passing of further emergency regulations designed to give the government carte blanche in the arrest and detention 
of suspects without trial.146  The government was permitted to detain any individual in the interests of public order 
for up to 28 days and, with the governor’s approval, for the duration of the emergency.  With 100,000 suspects by 
July 1953, the government began trying suspects on masse.  In the wake of the Lari massacre and further murders of 
European settlers by the Mau Mau, the governor extended capital punishments to include any assistance of terrorists in 
criminal activities, so vague as to make an offence of passing food or housing a Mau Mau militant.147  By the end of the 
emergency over 1000 Kikuyu would meet their end on the gallows.  However, even the emergency justice system could 
not cope with the large numbers and so the government increasingly relied on the use of detention orders (GDOs) for 
those who could not be prosecuted even under emergency legislation.148
The system of screening would go through one more mutation in the form of what was euphemistically called 
‘rehabilitation centres’ or the ‘pipeline’.  Ostensibly touted as camps for the reconstruction of the Kikuyu into civilised 
and governable citizens, they were in fact concentration camps for Mau Mau sympathisers considered ‘high risk’. 
Within the camp walls the inmates would be categorised into Blacks if they were Mau Mau officials or supporters, Greys 
if they were sympathisers and Whites if they were loyal to the colonial regime.149  The latter would soon be released, 
with ‘irredeemable’ blacks sent to labour camps to work punishing and insufferable work details. In the words of Elkins, 
these were Britain’s ‘gulags’.150  Indiscriminate brutality and violence was the norm in the camps but it was not to be 
systematized until the approach known as the ‘dilution technique’ was introduced.151  It was introduced as a measure 
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to combat the incredible resilience and defiance that the Kikuyu and other ethnic groups showed in the detention 
camps.  It involved the ordering of a detainee to perform a routine task.  When they refused, which they invariably did, 
a preponderance of camp warders would isolate and then force the detainee into submission, coercing and haranguing 
him until he finally confessed his oath.  This technique would later be introduced system wide as ‘operation progress’ 
with official Nairobi approval.  Force and brutality would no longer rely on the caprice of camp guards but be officially 
sanctioned as government policy.  Tellingly, the Historian V.G Kiernan likened the detention camps to any under the 
management of the Japanese or the Nazis during the Second World War.152
This strategy to crush the rebellion and dissolve the Kikuyu leadership would not only qualify as a form of 
psychological and cultural genocide and thus arguably constitute a form of mental harm prohibited by the UN 
convention, in particular article two,153 but also equate with Lemkin’s social and political techniques of genocide. 
With regard to the political technique Lemkin said that ‘In order further to disrupt national unity... Other political 
parties were dissolved’ [emphasis added].154  He went on to argue that to affect social genocide the destruction of the 
national pattern in the social field must be brought about by the abolition of the indigenous system of law and social 
justice and the imposition of the occupants, which, as revealed above, took on a particularly flagrant form after the Lari 
massacre during the emergency period.  Furthermore, in order to debilitate the social structure of the occupied it would 
be necessary to destroy the intelligentsia ‘because this group largely provides the national leadership and organizes 
resistance’.155 We see the characteristics of both the social and political techniques of genocide in the screening and the 
pipeline camp system.  Some detractors may argue that the Mau Mau did not equate with the national leadership of all 
the Kikuyu tribe, but if you consider that under emergency regulations all other opposition parties and groups had been 
disbanded, the Mau Mau became the only source of mobilisation and political expression left for the Kikuyu people.
Villageization
Perhaps the most punitive measure applied by the colonial government in their efforts to defeat the Mau Mau and 
subdue the Kikuyu was the policy of villageization – the compulsory resettlement of people from their scattered 
homesteads, which were destroyed, onto centralised villages surrounded by barbed wire and strategically situated on 
the road network.  The Kikuyu had all their livestock confiscated, their homesteads burned, and in the ensuing chaos 
families were often separated. In the camps themselves the Kikuyu were subjected to forced labour, the first several 
months of which was simply to build the huts they were to live in.  The policy had been initiated in earnest in June 
1954.  By the end of 1955, over a million Kikuyu had been herded into over eighty ‘protected’ villages.156
In essence the villages were designed to severe the entire community from the Mau Mau guerrillas.  According to 
Sorrenson it was the policy of villageisation that inflicted the coup de grâce on the Mau Mau.157  It was also a method of 
punishing the recalcitrant women and even children who had taken the Mau Mau oath to fight the injustices of British 
rule.  What normally awaited the arriving Kikuyu was ‘nothing save a cordon of armed loyalists and a nearby Home 
Guard post’.158  There was no shelter, food, water, sanitation facilities, or medical supplies: ‘It was a site of absolute 
suffering’.159  The policy of villageisation was characterised very often by twenty-three hour curfews with conditions 
so deleterious to human well being that famine and death was widespread.  Death became so routine that the Home 
Guards would order the villagers to dig trenches for the dead in readiness for the inevitable.160  Of the 150,000 Kikuyu 
who died as result of the war, the vast majority died in the protected villages.161
Torture was as widespread and common as it was in the detention camps; beatings and rape were rampant 
throughout the villages.  The Home Guard Posts were the central nodes of torture, Kikuyu being sent to receive their 
cruel and often deadly treatment if a ‘woman was too late for communal labor role call, if she walked too slowly or 
failed to fulfil her daily work quota, if she was suspected of harbouring Mau Mau sympathies – or worse, if she was 
caught trying to supply the remaining forest fighters’.162  As Elkins has argued, the actions of the Home Guard cannot 
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be understood unless we understand their training in the philosophy of the British Security forces, who were known 
by the detained villagers as haraka, ‘the fast ones’ due to the speed with which they could wreak carnage on the local 
population.  Among some of the more common techniques of torture inflicted by the British security forces were rape, 
beating by clubs and rifles butts, hanging, excrement based torture, captured Mau Mau fighters tied to the back of land 
rovers and driven around villages until their bodies had become dismembered and finally perhaps the most shocking: 
‘children slaughtered and their remains skewered and paraded around the villages’.163  This again demonstrates the 
sheer brutality and inhumanity of villageization.  It also must, as the conditions in the detention camps did, qualify as 
psychological terror and mental harm as prohibited under the UN convention. 
But most critically, the villageization programme, with its forced removals, destruction of homesteads and 
confiscation of their property in addition to the dissolution of their family units, inflicted on almost the entire Kikuyu 
population, affected the most traumatic severance of the Kikuyu from their traditional way of life.  The villageization 
programme intended to break the Kikuyu both psychologically and physically, exhausting what Lemkin called the 
‘spiritual resources’164 of the nation in order to force the Kikuyu to confess their oath and thus dissolve the bonds of 
solidarity with the Mau Mau movement, a movement which had become the only hope of salvaging some dignity 
and community quite apart from the issue of land alienation.  It would take the complete ‘obliteration of the Kikuyu 
domestic landscape’ to achieve this aim.165  The concentrated shock of genocide would reach its highest pitch in the 
villages, affecting the total annihilation of the Kikuyu way of life, decimating their economic, social, political and 
cultural figurations.
4. Conclusion
It has been argued in this paper that the dominant conception of genocide as defined by the UN convention is not 
fit for purpose, purged of the ‘offensive’ elements that threatened to corroborate the culpability of colonial powers 
in genocidal episodes both east and west of the Iron Curtain.  The ripples of this legacy bifurcated the long overdue 
emergence of a scholarly tradition dedicated to the study of genocide.  On one side stands the Liberal tradition with its 
individualist ontology which leaves accusations of colonial genocide beyond the reach of the very western liberal states 
from which many of the liberal scholars come.
On the other side stands the post-liberal school with its holist ontology focussing instead on the structures of 
genocide and the structures of the subjects of genocide, namely groups.  This approach recognises that social structures 
and economic systems which do not possess intention in the manner recognised by the UN convention are not 
amenable to cross examination.  Unfortunately, not just for lack of space, political institutions, modes of production 
and colonial rivalries cannot be put in the dock.
We have seen that a post-liberal approach can begin to illuminate the hidden socio-economic and political 
structures of genocide and its inner connections with colonisation.  Furthermore, this tradition is more consistent 
with the ontological axioms of the founder of the sociology of genocide, Raphael Lemkin.  Lemkin understood that 
‘genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, 
not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group’ [emphasis added].166  Therefore the efficacy of any 
genocidal practise must be appraised according to the extent to which it cripples the structures of any targeted entity 
or social figuration.
This tradition is thus equipped to deconstruct the relations of genocide, as they occurred under the Kenyan 
protectorate during Britain’s colonial reign and their genocidal effects on the Kikuyu tribe.  However, we have seen that 
although just such an ontological approach may be suited it suffers weaknesses that can be rectified with an infusion 
of a Marxist ontology into the cannon of post-liberal literature.  Firstly, a Marxist ontology corrects the reductionist 
and ‘static’ bias of Lemkin’s and the post-liberal school’s functionalism, thus treating social collectivities as dynamic 
figurations capable of organic change and cultural adaptation. Such an approach helps us to better distinguish cultural 
diffusion from cultural destruction.  This is important because as was shown the Kikuyu underwent cultural evolution 
on a voluntary basis which should not be confused with the forcible dimensions that attend any genocidal practise. 
Furthermore, a Marxist approach is better equipped to elucidate the determinants behind the inner connections 
between the broader global structures of the world economy and geo-political competition and the localised forces 
of a colonial economy and its attendant colonial state, however oblique and contradictory they may be.  What Wolfe 
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described as the ‘global dimension to the frenzy for native land’ is critically located in the laws of motion of the capitalist 
MOP and its corollary capitalist imperialism.167
On the local level of the Kenyan colony the dialectical interplay between the settler MOP, which has been 
identified as the genocidal instrument for the interdiction of the process of cultural change or reproduction, and the 
Kikuyu figuration p.is an interaction which is better explicated by the application of a Marx’s historical materialist 
method of analysis. Therefore, it is the contention of this author that colonial genocide can be better understood as 
capitalist genocide.
With these modifications, what is thus called a neo-Lemkinian lens once applied to the Kikuyu has revealed the 
operation of a number of key genocidal techniques schematically divided across two phases. In phase one the policies 
of land alienation and forced labour affected the crippling of the economic foundations of the Kikuyu, inflicting 
conditions of appalling depravation eventuating in cultural destruction. In the second more concentrated and acute 
phase of the genocidal process, three techniques were employed: repatriation, detention and villageization.  The effect 
of these policies was to realise the liquidation of the social leadership of the Kikuyu, the subjection of the Kikuyu to 
physical conditions designed to bring about their physical ruination and ultimately, a furtherance and intensification 
of the destruction of the social life of the Kikuyu.
Given the scope of the paper a few important areas of research were unfortunately not given the treatment they 
were due.  The nature of the Mau Mau resistance was only touched upon as and when it informed the genocidal process 
from the point of view of the genocidists, i.e. the colonists, their loyalist supporters and the colonial state. Too often in 
genocide scholarship the victims are treated as passive and powerless objects of genocide.  This was far from the truth 
in the case of the Kikuyu, who demonstrated unbounded courage and determination against a modern state machine 
with all the trappings of mechanised military hardware and the backing of a hegemonic power.
Further research on the legacy of the genocidal process is needed: Firstly in terms of whether and how the Kikuyu as 
a collective entity survived and managed to rebuild their figurations.  Secondly, the role played by the genocidal process 
in shaping the post-emergency settlement of the land question and its role in integrating the Kenyan economy into the 
modern structures of the global economy.  Thirdly, in a connected issue, research into what effects the balance of global 
economic and geo-political forces played beyond the first phase of the genocidal process, which witnessed the decline 
in influence and global reach of the British power.  How did the period of decolonization affect the genocidal process 
in Kenya and what were the effects of regional African politics in the unfolding of the events during the period under 
study in this paper?  Fourthly, what were the effects of the genocidal practises administered by the colonial authorities 
on the other major ethnic groups in Kenya, namely the Kamba, the Masai and the Embu.  On a methodological level, 
insufficient emphasis was placed on analysing the role of agency within the colonial state apparatus and the settler 
community.  All these questions were beyond the scope of this paper but must be addressed in future research to furnish 
a richer understanding of the genocidal process.
The lens of genocide, as understood from a Lemkinian perspective, is a sociological approach that is far too 
neglected by scholars of history and post-colonial studies to name just two disciplines; this is after all the first paper 
to apply the genocide lens to the period of colonisation of Kenya and the effects it had on the Kikuyu.  The point 
of this approach is not to pour scorn on the colonial crimes of the past and pick at old wounds but to gain a fuller 
understanding of the gravity of the effects that colonial policies had and neo-colonial policies do have on the life of 
indigenous groups around world, not just to expose them but to ensure they never happen again.
Appendix
Lemkin’s 8 techniques of Genocide (Lemkin, Axis Rule, 82-90):
•	 Political: involves the cessation of self-government and destruction of political institutions followed by 
the imposition of administration by the colonial occupants; all local political organisations are dissolved 
and imposition of parties of the occupant originating from the colonising power. 
•  Social: involves the annihilation of national leadership abolition of local courts and the imposition of 
the legal system of the occupant.
•	 Cultural: ban on the use of native language, imposition of colonial education and the rigid control or 
restriction/prohibition of cultural activities, e.g. art, theatre, music etc.
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•	 Economic: destruction of the foundation of economic existence.
•	 Biological: interdiction of the reproduction of the group by decreasing the birth rate or the apprehension 
of the children and their assimilation into the group of the occupant.
•	 Physical: mass murder and endangering of health.
•	 Religious: disruption of religious influence, destruction of religious leadership.
•	 Moral: creation of an atmosphere of moral debasement
